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Social interactions have been shown to play an important role in bacterial evolution and virulence. The majority of empirical studies
conducted have only considered social traits in isolation, yet numerous social traits, such as the production of spiteful bacteriocins
(anticompetitor toxins) and iron-scavenging siderophores (a public good) by the opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa,
are frequently expressed simultaneously. Crucially, both bacteriocin production and siderophore cheating can be favored under
the same competitive conditions, and we develop theory and carry out experiments to determine how the success of a bacteriocinproducing genotype is influenced by social cheating of susceptible competitors and the resultant impact on disease severity
(virulence). Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that the spiteful genotype is favored at higher local frequencies
when competing against public good cheats. Furthermore, the relationship between spite frequency and virulence is significantly
altered when the spiteful genotype is competed against cheats compared with cooperators. These results confirm the ecological
and evolutionary importance of considering multiple social traits simultaneously. Moreover, our results are consistent with recent
theory regarding the invasion conditions for strong reciprocity (helping cooperators and harming noncooperators).
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Social interactions are widespread in microbes and include behaviors such as communication, cooperative public goods production, and spiteful toxin production (West et al. 2007; Brown
and Buckling 2008). There has been a recent proliferation of empirical and theoretical studies investigating the selective forces
acting on social traits in bacteria (Bremermann and Pickering
1983; Frank 1992, 1996; West and Buckling 2003; Gardner
et al. 2004; Massey et al. 2004; Harrison et al. 2006; Brown
et al. 2008; Buckling and Brockhurst 2008; Vigneux et al. 2008;
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Inglis et al. 2009, 2011; Köhler et al. 2009; Bashey et al. 2012).
However, most studies to date consider social traits in isolation
(but see Gardner et al. 2007; Lehmann et al. 2007; Harrison and
Buckling 2009; Brown and Taylor 2010), yet multiple social traits
are typically expressed simultaneously (Williams et al. 2007;
Harrison and Buckling 2009). Here, we investigate how selection on two types of microbial social traits (spite: costly to
both actor and recipient, and public goods cooperation: costly
to the actor, beneficial to the recipient) can be altered by their
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interaction. Both spite and public goods cheating can be favored under the same competitive conditions, and we address
how the success of a toxin-producing (spiteful) lineage is influenced by social cheating of toxin-susceptible competitors. We
also investigate how competition between spiteful and cheating
phenotypes affects disease severity (virulence). Both spite and
public goods cooperation have been shown to be important factors in determining bacterial virulence as they both have an effect
on population growth rate and density within a host (Harrison
et al. 2006, Inglis et al. 2009, Köhler et al. 2009). Cooperative
interactions have been shown to increase the virulence of infections (Harrison et al. 2006, Köhler et al. 2009) whereas spiteful
interactions can attenuate virulence if the infecting population is
also composed of individuals susceptible to the spiteful action
(Massey et al. 2004, Vigneux et al. 2008, Inglis et al. 2009).
Spiteful behaviors appear to be common in microbes in the
form of metabolically costly (and in some cases even suicidal) production of anticompetitor toxins (Riley and Wertz 2002; Hawlena
et al. 2010). Spiteful behaviors can be favored by kin selection
when nonrelatives are preferentially affected (negative relatedness between actor and recipient) (Hamilton 1970), and the adverse effect on the recipient is high relative to the cost to the actor.
Differential effects of the toxins on nonkin versus kin is achieved
by microbes via linkage between toxin and immunity genes, rendering all individuals with the same toxin gene resistant to the
toxin; an example of a “green beard” (Hurst 1991; Gardner and
West 2004, 2010; Massey et al. 2004; Greig and Travisano 2008;
Wloch-Salamon et al. 2008; Inglis et al. 2009). Both theory and
data suggest that selection for spite is maximized when the spiteful
lineage is at an intermediate frequency in the population (Gardner
and West 2004, Inglis et al. 2009). When the spiteful lineage is
at low frequencies in the local interacting population, the benefit
gained from the spiteful act (e.g., freeing up resources) will be
more likely to be experienced by nonspiteful individuals. In contrast to this, at high local frequencies only a few competitors will
be affected by the spiteful behavior, hence relative costs of spite
will be high (Inglis et al. 2009).
Social environments that influence selection for spiteful behaviors are also likely to affect selection on indiscriminate cooperation. Indiscriminate cooperation (individually costly behaviors
that benefit all others in the vicinity) is extremely common in microbes and includes the public goods production of extracellular
enzymes and nutrient-scavenging molecules, such as siderophores
(Buckling and Brockhurst 2008). Maintaining cooperation in a
population relies on individuals interacting with their relatives,
which are more likely to possess the same cooperation gene, due
either to kin discrimination or population viscosity (Hamilton
1963; Smith 1964). Otherwise “social cheats,” individuals that
do not pay the cost of the cooperative behavior but reap all the
rewards, are able to invade and displace the cooperators. Note that

spiteful behaviors can also be viewed as a form of indirect, discriminating altruism, in that unaffected individuals with the spite
allele benefit from the behavior through removal of competitors
(Lehmann et al. 2006).
In this study, we take a joint theoretical and empirical approach, using the pathogenic bacterium Pseudomonas
aeruginosa, to determine how the success of spiteful cooperators
is affected by whether the susceptible competitors are themselves
public goods cheats or cooperators. Both strategies exist in natural populations of P. aeruginosa (e.g., Bodilis et al. 2009), yet
to date selection on spite and selection on cooperation have only
been studied in isolation (i.e., spite vs. nonspite; cooperators vs.
cheats). We focus on the production of pyocin S2 and type 1
pyoverdine by P. aeruginosa, a spiteful and a public goods cooperative trait, respectively. Pyocin S2 is a protein-based toxin
that inhibits phospholipid synthesis through DNA breakdown,
whereas type 1 pyoverdine is a fluorescent yellow–green, highaffinity iron chelator (a siderophore). We also investigate the impact of competition between spiteful and cheating genotypes on
P. aeruginosa virulence in an insect model system.

Materials and Methods
BACTERIAL STRAINS

Pseudomonas aeruginosa strain PAO1 was used as the spiteful
cooperator as it is a known producer of pyocin S2 (a bacteriocin)
and pyoverdine type 1 (a siderophore; Meyer 2000; Denayer et al.
2007; Inglis et al. 2009). PAO 1150–2, a transposon, knock-out
mutant of the pyocin S2 gene, psy2, that still produces pyoverdine type 1 was used as an isogenic nonspiteful cooperator. These
strains were competed against an S2-susceptible strain, O:9, that
does not produce any known toxins that act against PAO1 or
PAO 1150–2, but does produce equivalent levels of pyoverdine
type 1. We also competed the two strains against mutants of
O:9 that showed marked reductions in pyoverdine production.
These mutants were generated by evolving O:9 for approximately
14 generations in iron-limited conditions (see below) in batch
culture (transferred daily 1 in 100 dilution into fresh media for
two days). Six phenotypically white colonies of O:9 that exhibited
a reduction in iron-chelating compounds of more than 60% (as
confirmed by a CAS assay; Harrison et al. 2006) were chosen. Pyocin sensitivity of the six O:9 siderophore “cheats” was confirmed
using a simple plate assay as described in Inglis et al. (2009). A
detailed description of strains used can be found in Table 1.
Growth rates for the ancestral O:9 and evolved mutants were
calculated (using approximate Malthusian parameters; see competition assays described below) when the strains were growing
in monoculture in iron-supplemented media and found to be the
same (t = 0.273, 11 df, P > 0.79). However, the evolved mutants
showed a decrease in growth rate when grown in monoculture in
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A list of strains used in the experiments with details concerning pyoverdine and pyocin production and susceptibility to

Table 1.

pyocin S2.

Strains used

Description

PAO1

Wild-type P. aeruginosa
ATCC 15692
Transposon Knockout
Mutant of P. aeruginosa
PW3083 (Jacobs et al.
2003)
Wild-type P. aeruginosa,
pyocin S2 sensitive
(Smith et al. 1992)

PAO1150-2

O:9



O:9 mutant 3
O:9 mutant 4
O:9 mutant 6
O:9 mutant 40
O:9 mutant 50






iron-limited media, compared to the ancestral strain (t = 4.84,
11 df, P < 0.0047). The evolved mutants also showed increased
growth rate in iron-limited media when grown with a pyoverdine
type 1 producing strain (PAO1150–2, t = 2.69, 11 df, P < 0.0227)
compared to when grown in isolation, indicating they are able to
use type 1 pyoverdine. The evolved mutants reduced the growth
rate of the pyoverdine-producing strain (PAO1150–2, t = 3.1,
11 df, P < 0.021) compared to when PAO1150–2 is grown in isolation, indicating that this interaction can be considered “cheating.” Growth rates of PAO1 and PAO1150–2 were also compared
when grown in monoculture and did not differ significantly (t =
0.649, 11 df, P > 0.73).
COMPETITION ASSAYS

Overnight cultures of all strains were grown in 30-mL glass universals containing 6 mL of King’s medium B (KB), shaking at
0.65 g (relative centrifugal force) and 37◦ C for 18 h, and then diluted to an OD600nm of 1.8 (approximately cell density = 109 /mL)
to ensure similar numbers of bacteria per milliliter. These cultures were subsequently grown on agar plates to determine the
number of bacteria inoculated at the beginning of the experiment,
using colony-forming units (CFUs) as an approximate measure.
Thirty-milliliter glass universals containing 6 mL of KB broth
were inoculated with a total of 104 cells with different starting
frequencies of the individual strains. Populations were subjected
to iron-limited conditions by the addition of 100 µg/mL human
apotransferrin (Sigma, Gillingham, UK), a natural iron chelator,
and 20 mM sodium bicarbonate, necessary for iron chelator activity (Meyer et al. 1996).
Our approach was to compare the relative fitness of PAO1
and the isogenic pyocin knockout when competing at different fre-
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Pyocin S2
production

Pyocin S2
sensitivity

Pyoverdine
production

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

quencies against the pyocin-susceptible pyoverdin producer (cooperator) and the pyocin-susceptible pyoverdin “cheats.” Specifically, we competed PAO1 against each of the six O:9 isolates
exhibiting reduced siderophore production at starting frequencies
of 99.9%, 99%, 90%, 50%, 10%, 1%, and 0.1%, and separately
against the O:9 ancestor in six replicates. The same competition
experiments were carried out for PAO1150–2 against the O:9
cooperators and cheats. Cultures were propagated in a shaking incubator at 0.65 g and 37◦ C and sampled after 96 h, allowing time
for effects of the bacteriocin to be observed (Inglis et al. 2009).
We plated the various treatments on KB agar plates and counted
the number of CFUs for each strain: all strains were easily distinguishable from one another because of unique colony morphology
and size. At the more extreme frequencies, antibiotic plates were
required to give better resolution of colony counts, which was
possible due to the different antibiotic resistance profiles of the
assorted strains (PAO1 resistant to streptomycin 1250 µg/mL,
O:9 resistant to rifampicin 312.5 µg/mL, and PAO 1150-2 resistant to tetracycline 312.5 µg/mL). Selection coefficients (S) were
used to estimate the fitness of PAO1 and PAO1150–2 at a range
of starting frequencies relative to the common competitors O:9
and O:9 siderophore cheats, where S = (mPAO1/1150−2 – mO:9 )/
mO:9 , and (m) refers to ln(final density/starting density) (Lenski
et al. 1991). Selection coefficients were preferable to simply using
growth rates (m), to control for between-tube variation.
IN VIVO VIRULENCE ASSAYS

Virulence assays were performed as previously described (Miyata
et al. 2003; Harrison et al. 2006; Inglis et al. 2009).
Briefly, overnight cultures of PAO1, the six O:9 isolates, and
PAO1150–2 were diluted in minimal salt solution. Fifth
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Results
MODEL

We extend a simple mathematical model for the evolution of bacterial spite (Inglis et al. 2009) to address whether the invasion of
a spiteful mutant will be enhanced if the mutant also invests more
than the resident in public goods cooperation (i.e., if the spiteful
lineage is competing against a public goods cheat). The heuristic model framework in Inglis et al. 2009 (building on Gardner
et al. 2004 and Frank 1998) assumes that the bacterial population is structured into patches (e.g., hosts), and that the fitness of
the focal mutant strain (present at a frequency p within the focal
patch, the remaining 1–p being the resident strain) is dependent
on its growth rate measured relative to its competitors, a fraction
a of which is found locally within the patch and a fraction 1–a is
found globally across the population. Further details on the model
structure are presented in the Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the established invasion conditions for
mutant strains investing only in spite (dashed-line region) or only
in cooperation (dotted-line region) as a function of the scale of

1.0

Cooperation
0.8

0.6
a

instar waxmoth (Galleria mellonella) larvae (Livefood UK, Rooks
Bridge, UK; http://www.livefood.co.uk) were randomly allocated
to be inoculated with 104 CFUs of PAO1/O:9 and PAO 1150–
2/O:9 mixtures. The starting frequencies of the bacterial combinations consisted of 99%, 50%, and 1% PAO1 to O:9 or PAO1150–2
to O:9. Larvae were swabbed with 70% ethanol to prevent contamination of the injection site and injected into the abdomen
using Terumo 1-mL disposal syringes and BD Microlance 30G
1 
needles. The injection volume was 50 µl in all cases. Twenty
2
larvae were assigned to each treatment, and a further 20 larvae
were injected with 50 µl of minimal salt solution as negative
controls. Larvae were then incubated at 37◦ C and monitored for
death at 30-min intervals between 10 and 18 h postinoculation.
Larvae were scored as dead if they failed to respond to mechanical
stimulation of the head.
Overall density of the different bacterial strains within the
caterpillar hosts was also measured. Caterpillars were inoculated
as previously described (Harrison et al. 2006; Inglis et al. 2009)
and incubated for 8 h at 37◦ C. Larvae were then weighed, dipped
in 70% ethanol to kill surface contaminants, and homogenized in
500 µl minimal salt solution using a plastic pestle. Homogenates
were centrifuged at 3000 rpm for 3 min to pellet the solid, and
aliquots of diluted homogenate plated onto KB agar. Agar plates
were supplemented with 15 µg/mL ampicillin to select against
growth of native larval-gut bacteria (this concentration of ampicillin does not affect the growth of P. aeruginosa) (Harrison et al.
2006). Plates were incubated overnight at 37◦ C and subsequently
scored for CFUs. All statistical analyses were performed in R
(2.9.2).

Spite
0.4

0.2

Spite given Cooperation
0.0
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

p
Mutant invasion conditions as a function of local competition a, and local frequency, p. Regions favoring investment
in spite only (dashed line, eq. A5), cooperation only (dotted line,

Figure 1.

eq. A7), and spite given cooperation (solid line, eq. A8). Models
are derived in the Appendix. Parameters are c = 0.4, d = 0.2, k = 2,
b = 2.

competition (from purely local, a = 1, to purely global, a = 0)
and local frequency, p. In keeping with existing theoretical and
empirical findings, we see that spite is most favored under conditions of high local competition and intermediate local frequencies
(dashed-line region [Gardner et al. 2004; Gardner and West 2004;
Inglis et al. 2009]), whereas cooperation is most favored under
conditions of low local competition and high local frequencies
(dotted-line area [Frank 1998; Griffin et al. 2004]). Note that if
we assume the individual trait to be vanishingly rare across the
global population, and locally present at frequency p, then p is
the coefficient of relatedness measured with respect to the global
population (Frank 1998; Inglis et al. 2009).
In Figure 2, we focus on the fitness of a spiteful strain under
conditions of significant local competition (high a). In Figure 2A,
we see again the established result that spiteful versus sensitive
competition in the absence of any cooperative differential leads
to a peak in spite fitness at intermediate frequencies (Gardner
et al. 2004, Inglis et al. 2009). In Figure 2B, we see how this
picture changes when we introduce a cooperative differential,
specifically when the sensitive strain is cheating on the public
goods provision of its spiteful neighbor. The result is a shift in
peak spite (plus cooperation) fitness toward higher frequencies.
Below we experimentally test these predictions, but first we ask
whether this pattern can be understood simply as an additive combination of a spite fitness effect (fitness maximized at intermediate
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A

B

2.0

1.2

fitness

1.8
1.6

1.0

1.4

0.8

1.2
0.6

1.0
0.2

0.4

p

0.6

0.8

1.0

0.2

0.4

p

0.6

0.8

1.0

Figure 2. Fitness of spiteful strains as a function of initial frequency p and scale of competition a. (A) Fitness of spiteful strain competing
against a sensitive strain, no difference in cooperative investments (eq. A4). Solid line = purely local competition (a = 1), dotted line =

largely local competition (a = 0.7). Parameters are c = 0.4, d = 0.2, k = 2, b = 2. (B) Fitness of spiteful cooperator competing against
sensitive cheat (eq. A3). Solid lines, a = 1. dotted line, a = 0.7. Parameters are c = 0.4, d = 0.2, k = 2, b = 2.

frequencies) and a cooperation effect (fitness maximized at high
frequencies), or whether the value of spiteful investments changes
as a result of association with cooperative investments.
Using our extension to the Inglis 2009 model (Appendix) we
ask, what is the effect of increasing cooperation on the value of
investments into spite? We find that additional investment into
cooperation acts to change the relative costs and benefits of investments into spite in a systematic way. Specifically, selection
for spite is enhanced whenever the conditions for investment in
cooperation alone are met (dotted-line area in Fig. 1). Conversely,
selection for spite is inhibited if cooperation is selected against.
Thus, selection for spite (given cooperation) is enhanced at high
local frequencies but diminished at low local frequencies. These
results have a simple biological interpretation: when a cooperative focal strain is locally prevalent (high p) then local population
growth rate will be high, and hence the relative growth rate reduction of an additional fixed investment into spite is reduced. This
expands the region of favorable investments into spite toward
higher frequencies (Fig. 1).
The heuristic approach underlying Figure 1 (Frank 1998;
Gardner et al. 2004; Inglis et al. 2009) assumes that investments
in spite and/or cooperation have negligible consequences for the
local frequency p of the focal strain (weak selection). By relaxing
this assumption, we can see further reasons to expect a strengthening of selection for spite at higher frequencies. Specifically, if
we assume that cooperation reduces the local frequency p (due
to cheater exploitation), then when p is initially high (above the
point of peak investment in spite, see Appendix), any reduction
in p toward intermediate frequencies will generate an increased
reward from spiteful investments.
Finally, we ask what are the implications for pathogen virulence of the coupling of cooperative and spiteful traits in a single
lineage? Looking at each trait in isolation, we recover established
results (Fig. 3, Appendix), specifically that the virulence of infections containing cooperative genotypes is maximized when
cooperative genotypes are at high frequencies (Brown et al. 2002;
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West and Buckling 2003; Harrison et al. 2006; Brown et al. 2009),
whereas the virulence of infections containing spiteful (and susceptible) genotypes is minimized when spiteful genotypes are at
intermediate frequencies (Gardner et al. 2004; Inglis et al. 2009).
Turning to the spiteful cooperators, we find that virulence will
follow a hybrid path with increasing local frequency of the spiteful cooperator p (solid line, Fig. 3), with the intermediate minima
(characteristic of spiteful interactions) lost whenever investments
in cooperation are sufficiently valuable, relative to the value of
investments in spite.

IN VITRO

Our model predicts that competing against less-cooperative public good “cheats” should boost the relative fitness of invading
spiteful versus nonspiteful genotypes at higher local frequencies,
p. This prediction holds across a wide range of scales of increasingly local competition. To empirically test this hypothesis, we
determined the relative growth rate of a cooperating spiteful strain
when competed against both cheating and cooperating sensitive
strains at a range of starting frequencies. These treatments test the
relationship between starting frequency and fitness for spite only
(dashed line in Figs. 1, 2A) and spite given cooperation (solid
line in Figs. 1, 2B) in our heuristic model. We also determined the
growth rate of an isogenic cooperating but nonspiteful strain when
competing against the same susceptible cheats and cooperators as
above: the former examines the relationship between cooperationonly fitness and starting frequency (dotted line in Fig. 1), whereas
the latter is a no-social-conflict control (no spite and everyone
cooperating), where no relationship was expected. Competitions
were carried out under local competition (single shaken tubes),
although the scale of competition was less than entirely local (i.e.,
a < 1), because wall-growth inevitably creates a degree of spatial
structure within each tube.
We calculated selection coefficients for the spiteful and
nonspiteful cooperator under the different scenarios. We first
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2.5

2.0

Virulence

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

0.2

0.4

p

0.6

0.8

1.0

Figure 3. Virulence (mean within-host growth rate) as a function of frequency of focal strain. For all lines, the resident strain displays
neither social trait, and has virulence = 1. Dotted line = a focal cooperative strain. Dashed line = a focal spiteful strain. Solid line = a
focal cooperative and spiteful strain. Other parameters, b = 2, c = 0.4, d = 0.2, k = 2.

Relative growth of spiteful compared to nonspiteful bacteria when competed against sensitive cooperators (i.e., all strains produce siderophores) in iron-limited media. Spiteful bacteriocin production (PAO1: siderophore and bacteriocin producer vs. O:9: siderophore

Figure 4.

producer sensitive to bacteriocin) is favored at intermediate starting frequencies as previously described in noniron-limited media. Error
bars represent ± 1 SE of the mean.

determined how the relative benefit of spite changed with
frequency when competing against sensitive genotypes that were
also producing wild-type levels of siderophore in iron-limited
media (i.e., no differential investment in cooperation). This experiment replicates our previous study (Inglis et al. 2009), except
here the media is iron-limited. Consistent with this previous work
and theoretical predictions, the benefit of spite was maximized at

intermediate frequencies (linear term F 1,31 = 44.65, P < 0.001;
quadratic term F 1,30 = 29.14, P < 0.001) (Fig. 4). By contrast,
the nonspiteful strain displayed a weakly negative relationship
with starting frequency (slope = –0.22, linear term F 1,33 = 5.63,
P < 0.024). This negative relationship was not predicted by our
model as there is no obvious social conflict, and may have arisen
because competing strains were not isogenic, and are perhaps
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Figure 5.

Relative growth of spiteful compared to nonspiteful bacteria when competed against sensitive public goods cheats (i.e.,

bacteria that do not produce siderophores). Spiteful bacteriocin production (PAO1: siderophore and bacteriocin producer vs. O:9 cheats:
siderophore nonproducer sensitive to bacteriocin) is now favored at intermediate and high starting frequencies, whereas cooperators
(PAO1150–2: siderophore producer vs. O:9 cheats: siderophore nonproducer) display a strong negative frequency dependent relationship
with starting frequency. Error bars represent ± 1 SE of the mean.

using slightly different resources, resulting in negative frequency
dependent fitness (Inglis et al. 2009).
Next we competed the spiteful genotype against the sensitive
genotypes that display a marked reduction in siderophore production (sensitive cheats). Spite was favored at intermediate and high
starting frequencies (a clear peak shift to the right), as predicted
by our model (linear term F 1,39 = 31.19, P < 0.001; quadratic
term no longer significant) (Fig. 5). This difference between the
spiteful “cooperators” when competed against sensitive cheats or
sensitive cooperators was highly significant when a single polynomial model was fitted for the whole dataset (x-intercept: F 1,73 =
111.56, P < 0.001, difference between slopes: F 1,73 = 7.66,
P < 0.007). When the isogenic nonspiteful cooperators were
competed against the sensitive cheats, we still observed a negative
relationship between starting frequency and selection coefficients
(slope = –0.29, linear term F 1,40 = 33.23, P < 0.001). However,
the fitness of the nonspiteful cooperators was lower when competing against sensitive cheats compared to sensitive cooperators
(F 1,74 = 49.55, P < 0.001). This difference is attributable to the
growth rate advantage sensitive cheats have over sensitive cooperators in the presence of exogenously produced siderophores.
IN VIVO

We next determined the importance of spiteful interactions in
driving the relationship between starting frequency of compet-
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ing genotypes and virulence, when cooperating genotypes compete with cheats. We manipulated starting populations to give
high (99%), intermediate (50%), and low (1%) frequencies of
the spiteful cooperator (PAO1) relative to the susceptible cheats
(O:9 siderophore mutants), and compared these results with
those obtained for coinfections with the nonspiteful cooperator
(PAO1150–2) and susceptible cheats (O:9 siderophore mutants).
Our model suggests the reduction in virulence associated with
intermediate frequencies of a spiteful genotype (as seen in both
theoretical and empirical studies; Inglis et al. 2009) should be
attenuated or removed when spiteful cooperators compete against
cheats. Virulence models (including those cited above) typically
assume that virulence is simply a positive function of withinhost growth rate, and when we measured density of bacteria
within caterpillars, our results were entirely consistent with our
model prediction. Both cooperative strains (spiteful/nonspiteful)
displayed a positive curvilinear relationship between starting frequency and bacterial density after 8 h growth when in competition
with susceptible cheats (linear term F 1,95 = 43.15, P < 0.0001;
quadratic term F 1,93 = 4.65, P < 0.034), with nonspiteful cooperators reaching overall higher densities (F 1,94 = 75.56, P < 0.0001)
(Fig. 6A). This positive monotonic relationship between in vivo
growth rate and cooperator frequency is consistent with theory
(including our model) (Brown et al. 2002; West and Buckling
2003) and experimental results (Harrison et al. 2006). Crucially,
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Figure 6. Bacterial density and virulence in a caterpillar host. (A) Bacterial density affected by starting frequency of spiteful and nonspiteful cooperators. Lowest densities were observed in low and intermediate spiteful cooperator treatments. High starting frequencies
of spiteful cooperators reached similar densities to that of low and intermediate nonspiteful cooperators. The highest density was

observed in the high nonspiteful cooperator frequency. Error bars represent ± 1 SE of the mean. (B) Average time to death of caterpillars
infected with different starting frequencies of spiteful and nonspiteful cooperators. Lowest virulence (as measured by time to death) was
observed in the low and intermediate spiteful cooperator treatments. The highest virulence is found in the high starting frequency of
nonspiteful cooperator, with similar virulence occurring in the intermediate and low nonspiteful cooperator treatments and high starting
frequencies of spiteful cooperators.
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there was no evidence of reduced density at intermediate frequencies of spiteful cooperators, as has been observed under almost
identical experimental conditions when the spiteful cooperator
competed against the susceptible cooperator used in this study
(Inglis et al. 2009).
We also measured virulence directly, in terms of time to
death of caterpillars. These results were broadly consistent with
the model and in vivo growth rate data. We found that virulence
was most greatly attenuated at intermediate and low frequencies of spiteful cooperators in competition with sensitive cheats
(frequency was highly significant in the survival analysis, P <
0.0001, with 50 df and intermediate and low frequencies differed
significantly from the high frequency, P < 0.004 and P < 0.001
respectively, but there was no significant difference between intermediate and low frequencies, P > 0.075 with 51 df) (Fig. 6B). The
highest virulence was observed at high frequencies of nonspiteful cooperators, and no difference was seen between intermediate
and low frequencies (frequency was again highly significant in
explaining survival, P < 0.0001 with 50 df, but there was no
significant difference between intermediate and low frequencies,
P > 0.53 with 51 df) (Fig. 6B).

Discussion
We investigated how the success of a siderophore- and
bacteriocin-producing P. aeruginosa genotype is altered by
whether its conspecific competitor is itself a siderophore producer or cheat, and the resulting impact on virulence in insects.
We show in vitro that the unimodal relationship between the
fitness of spiteful, toxin-producing bacteria and their frequency
(Fig. 4) is altered when the spiteful genotype is more cooperative
than its competitor, resulting in a systematic shift in peak fitness toward higher frequencies (Fig. 5). Furthermore, we demonstrate that the virulence of infections of insects where there is
competition between cooperating and cheating bacteria is significantly altered depending on the starting frequencies of the
genotypes, and whether the cooperating bacteria are also spiteful
(Fig. 6A, B). We found positive monotonic relationships between
virulence and cooperator frequency for both spiteful and nonspiteful genotypes, with greater, overall virulence in infections with
nonspiteful bacteria. Importantly, previous work has shown that
in the absence of a cooperator–cheat conflict, virulence is minimized at intermediate frequencies of spiteful genotypes (Inglis
et al. 2009), demonstrating that competing against social cheats
fundamentally alters the relationship between virulence and spite.
All these results are qualitatively consistent with the predictions
from our mathematical model (Figs. 1–3, Appendix).
Our model gives us some very simple insights as to why
spite is more beneficial at high frequencies when competing with
public goods cheats. First, the model shows that simultaneous
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investments in cooperation can change the relative benefit/cost
ratio of investments into spite, with the result that selection for
spite is systematically enhanced when spiteful cooperators are at
high frequencies. This is because high frequencies of cooperation
will increase the growth rate of the focal strain, and so lessen the
relative growth rate costs of a fixed investment into spite. Second,
if we additionally allow for cheats to initially increase locally in
frequency, due to their competitive advantage with respect to the
public good trait, then investments in spite can be further favored
if the initial frequency of the spiteful cooperators is sufficiently
high. This is because spiteful behaviors are maximally favored
at intermediate frequencies, and the invasion of the cheats can
push the frequency of the spiteful cooperators from high to intermediate frequencies. The net result of both processes is to shift
the maximal value of spite to higher frequencies. There may of
course be other mechanisms operating that help to explain our
results that are not captured in our model: for example, if these
traits are expressed at different times. However, it is not necessary
to invoke such specific biological details to explain the results.
We wish to reiterate that that our model is not a demographically explicit or “closed” model of evolutionary change, instead
we take a simplifying “black box” approach by summarizing numerous demographic effects via the parameters a and p. Although
the heuristic “open model” approach sacrifices ecological specificity, it gains in terms of generality (allowing comparisons across
diverse demographies) and tractability (see e.g., Gardner and West
2006; Brown and Taylor 2010). Clearly, the two approaches are
highly complementary, and it remains to be seen what further insights can be generated via closed models of multiple social trait
evolution under specific demographic regimes.
Although our experimental results highlight how public
goods cooperation enhances the value of spite, our theory also
illustrates that the converse can also hold true—spite can enhance
the value of public goods investment by increasing the local frequency of producers (eq. A10). Together, these results outline a
potential mechanistic synergy between spiteful and cooperative
traits, which suggests that the long-term joint evolutionary dynamics will be more complex than predicted by analysis of either
trait alone (Brown and Taylor 2010).
Qualitative patterns in our virulence data were consistent
with previous studies examining social traits in isolation (Brown
et al. 2002; West and Buckling 2003; Gardner et al. 2004; Harrison
et al. 2006; Inglis et al. 2009). First, virulence, as determined by
the growth rate of the whole infecting population, increased with
the frequency of siderophore cooperators. This is unsurprising, as
siderophore concentration increases growth rate by allowing iron
to be scavenged from the caterpillar host. Second, the presence
of spiteful genotypes reduced mean in vivo growth rate and virulence, because bacteriocin production is both costly to the actors
(cell lysis) and the victims (arrests cell replication by inhibiting
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phospholipid synthesis). However, in contrast to previous work investigating spite and virulence in P. aeruginosa (Inglis et al. 2009)
in the absence of a cooperator–cheat conflict, virulence was not
minimized at intermediate frequencies of spiteful genotypes, but
rather was minimal at both low and intermediate frequencies and
increased at high frequencies. This is the pattern expected from
our theoretical work, and is presumably the result of increased
conflict between spiteful and cheating strains at low and intermediate frequencies. When the spiteful lineage is at low frequency
in the competing population, there will be a reduction in growth
rate as siderophore levels are low, thereby reducing virulence.
At intermediate frequencies of the spiteful genotype, siderophore
production will also be reduced to some extent, and total bacterial density reductions resulting from killing the sensitive cheats
will also be at their greatest. The time to death data were largely
consistent with the in vivo growth data, with variation likely to be
attributable to the genetic heterogeneity of the caterpillars.
In the current study, cheating genotypes are always susceptible to pyocins, and hence spite can be considered as a form of punishment in this experimental context; an association noted in some
recent theoretical studies (Nakamaru and Iwasa 2006; Lehmann
et al. 2007). The concept of strong reciprocity—the punishment
of noncooperators by cooperators—is suggested to be an important process in the evolution of cooperation (e.g., Bowles and
Gintis 2004). Our theoretical results suggest that punishment can
be favored over nonpunishment when at intermediate to high frequencies in structured populations, but cannot invade from rare.
This result is broadly consistent with recent theory under conditions where cooperation and punishment are not in linkage; an assumption appropriate for our theoretical results, given that we are
measuring fitness of cooperating punishers invading cooperating
nonpunishers. By contrast, punishment can theoretically invade
from rare when these traits are in linkage (Lehmann et al. 2007).
It is interesting to note that there is an association between pyocin
and pyoverdine outside of this experimental context. Specifically,
P. aeruginosa pyocin S2 is taken up through the primary pyoverdine receptor, FvpA type 1 (Denayer et al. 2007). Genotypes that
evolve to exploit a strain’s pyoverdine type (of which there are a
number of alleles [Tummler and Cornelis 2005]) may, therefore,
become vulnerable to the competitor’s pyocin.
Here, we have shown that spiteful behaviors, or more specifically bacteriocin (pyocin) production, are critically affected by
simultaneous investments in another social trait, in this case indiscriminate public goods cooperation (pyoverdine production).
We have shown that this, in turn, can have important repercussions when considering virulence in P. aeruginosa infections.
Both pyocin (spite) and pyoverdine (cooperation) are likely to be
of importance in clinical settings, especially cystic fibrosis, where
pyocin-producing and pyoverdine-cheating strains are commonly
found during the course of an infection (Govan 1986; De Vos

et al. 2001). This study may, therefore, help to explain patterns
of virulence in natural infections, and could even have practical implications in terms of manipulating the competitive arena
through some type of directed therapy (i.e., the introduction of
pyocin-producing, public goods cheats), thereby reducing overall
virulence. More generally, spiteful and cooperative behaviors are
almost ubiquitous among bacteria (and may be common among
other microbes, both pathogenic and nonpathogenic), hence an
understanding of the evolution of these behaviors may be key to
understanding microbial community dynamics and functions.
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Appendix
We base our approach on Frank’s (Frank 1998) model of evolution
under local competition, where fitness w is defined by the fecundity of a focal strain gf , measured relative to the focal strain’s
competitors—a fraction a of which is found locally within a focal
patch (with average fecundity gl ) and a fraction (1–a) of which is
found globally across the population (with average fecundity gg ),
that is,
w=

gf
.
agl + (1 − a)gg

(A1)

Following Inglis et al. 2009 and Gardner et al. 2004, we
define focal, local, and global growth rates as a function of independent investments by the focal mutant strain in spite (and
now, cooperation), in a population of residents that do not
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invest in either trait. Note that our analyses allow for mutants
that differentially invest in spite only (recovering results of Inglis
2009), cooperation only (recovering Frank 1998, p. 115), or both.
Investments in spite and in cooperation incur costs expressed
as reductions in growth rate of d and c, respectively (relative to a
normalized growth rate of 1 for an asocial clonal population). We
further assume that the focal strain is immune to its bacteriocin,
but a proportion pk cells of the competitor strain is killed, thus
k measures the killing efficiency of the bacteriocin produced by
the killer lineage, present in proportion p. The cooperative trait in
turn renders a growth advantage pb to all cells within the patch,
regardless of their strain type. Therefore, we have
g f = 1−d − c + pb,

gg = 1.

(A2c)

Note that the advantage to a focal lineage of spiteful investments is felt via a reduction in the fecundity of their local competitors, gl . Together, these assumptions yield a neighbor-modulated
fitness function
(A3)

1 − c + bp
.
1 + ap(b + c)

(A6)

The condition for the focal cooperative strain to be favored
(wc > 1) simplifies to
c<

(A2b)

1 − d − c + pb
.
1 + ap(b − c − d − k(1 − p))

wc = w|k=d=0 =

(A2a)

gl = p(g f ) + (1− p)(1− pk + pb),

w=

act (Cs = d, Bs = –(1 – p)k, Rs = –ap/(1 – ap)). Note that
here relatedness to victims is measured relative to the pool of
competitors (Queller 1994), as opposed to being measured relative
to the entire population.
Next, we can take the same approach to investigate selection
on mutants differing only in their cooperative investments. We
consider a mutant cooperative strain by setting k = d = 0 in
equation (A3),

b (1 − a) p
,
1 − ap

(A7)

illustrated by the dotted-line region in Figure 1. This again
is an established result (Frank 1998, pp. 114–115, empirically
supported by Griffin et al 2004), which can be expressed in terms
of Hamilton’s rule, RB > C, with Cy = c, By = b, and Ry = (1 –
a)p/(1 – ap), which is again a measure of relatedness relative to
competitors (Queller 1994), but now relatedness to clone mates,
relative to competitors. Note that in the limit of the focal strain
being globally rare, relatedness to clone mates, measured relative
to the global population, remains R = p (Inglis 2009, Gardner
2004).
SELECTION ON SPITE, GIVEN SIMULTANEOUS
INVESTMENTS IN COOPERATION

SELECTION ON SEPARATE INVESTMENTS
IN COOPERATION AND SPITE

We begin by considering the growth of a rare mutant deviant in one
strategy only, invading a resident population. First, we consider
the fitness of a mutant differing only in its spiteful investment (ws )
setting b = c = 0 in equation (A3) and so recovering the fitness
function of Inglis 2009,
ws = w|b=c=0 =

1−d
.
1 − ap(d + k(1 − p))

(A4)

The condition for the focal spiteful strain to be favored is
when its growth rate exceeds that of its competitors, that is, when
ws > 1 (dashed-line region in Fig. 1), which simplifies to
d<

akp(1 − p)
.
1 − ap

(A5)

This is an established result (Gardner et al. 2004, Inglis et
al. 2009, empirically supported by Inglis et al. 2009), which can
be expressed in terms of Hamilton’s rule, RB > C with negative
“benefits” and negative relatedness to the victims of the spiteful

Next we ask whether mutant investments in cooperation will help
or hinder investments in mutant spite. To address whether additional investments in spite are beneficial, on a background of
mutant cooperation, we study the fitness of the double mutant,
relative to the fitness of mutants for the cooperative trait alone,
that is, ws|c = w/wc . Note that when b = c = 0, ws|c = ws . The
condition for selection to favor additional investments in spite
in a mutant cooperative strain is then ws|c > 1, which can be
written as
d<

akp (1 − p) [1 + bp − c]
.
1 − ap[1 − b (1 − p)]

(A8)

The region where this inequality is met and selection for
additional spite is favored is illustrated by the solid-line region in
Figure 1. Note that when b = c = 0, the square brackets equal 1
and equation (A8) simplifies to equation (A5). To identify whether
the modifying effect of cooperation enhances selection for spite,
we look for parameter regions where ws|c > 1 (solid-line region,
Fig. 1) is more permissive of spite evolution than ws > 1 (dashedline region, Fig. 1). Specifically, we look for conditions where
both inequalities ws|c > 1 and ws < 1 are met. Some algebra
shows this to be the case whenever wc > 1 (eq. A7), that is,
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when cooperative investment is present and the mutant strain
is at an appreciable frequency and competition is sufficiently
global. This effect can be seen graphically in Figure 1; the region
favoring spite given cooperation (solid line, Fig. 1) is enlarged
with respect to the region favoring spite alone (dashed line, Fig.
1) only in the region favoring cooperation alone (dotted line,
Fig. 1).
m(S)/m(Sd=k=0 )|b=c=0 .

(A9)

INTERACTIONS MEDIATED BY CHANGES IN LOCAL
FREQUENCY, p

One general assumption of our model approach that is worth
further examination is the assumption of weak selection, that
is, the social traits themselves do not immediately modify the
population structure, represented by the local frequency of the
focal strain, p. However, it is well understood that investments
in spite can significantly increase the local frequency of the
focal lineage (due to death of competitors), whereas investments in cooperation can decrease the local frequency (due
to competition from cheats). To explore the consequences of
changing p on the value of investment in cooperation, consider
that
dwc
∝ ac (1 + b − c) + (1 − a) b.
dp

(A10)

From equation (A10), we see that increasing spite (by increasing p) can have a positive effect on the value of investments
in cooperation. Conversely,
dws
∝ d + k(1 − 2 p).
dp

(A11)

Here, we see that increasing cooperation (if decreases p below (d + k)/2k) can enhance selection for spite.
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VIRULENCE

We now return to the simple fecundity equations (A2) to ask
what are the general implications for host virulence of varying
proportions p of a double mutant lineage competing within a
focal host with a wild-type lineage. We make the simplifying
assumption that host virulence v (additional host mortality) is
directly proportional to the average fecundity of pathogens within
a focal host gl (see eq. A2b). This assumption is supported by our
virulence assay that measured bacterial density (Fig. 6A). Now
we ask, what is the effect on virulence of increasing the proportion
of the focal mutant strain?
dv
∝ b − c − d + k(1 − 2 p).
dp

(A12)

Thus, in the absence of any spiteful investment (k = d =
0), we see that increasing the local presence of a cooperative
lineage will always increase virulence (Brown et al. 2002; West
and Buckling 2003; Harrison et al. 2006; Brown et al. 2009).
Conversely, in the absence of any cooperative trait (b = c =
0), we see that increasing the local presence of a spiteful lineage competing with a nonspiteful lineage will decrease virulence
if p < (d + k)/2k, and then increase virulence thereafter. Given
the cost of spite is less than the magnitude of its maximal effect
(i.e., d < k), this result implies that virulence will be minimized
for intermediate local frequencies of a spiteful lineage (Gardner
and West 2004; Inglis et al. 2009). Finally, for the case of a double
mutant, we can see from equation (A12) that increasing the local
presence of the mutant strain will increase virulence whenever
p>

c+d +k−b
.
2ks

Therefore, the intermediate minima that are characteristic of
spite-mediate virulence (Gardner et al. 2004; Inglis et al. 2009)
are lost whenever b > c + d + k. Figure 3 illustrates the virulence
v as a function of p, under these three distinct scenarios.

